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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 13-4074 
 ___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
RICHARD BROWN, 
a/k/a Christopher Johnson 
 
RICHARD BROWN, 
                              Appellant  
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 2-12-cr-00202-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 11, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR., and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: December 15, 2014) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Richard Brown (“Brown” or “Appellant”) pled guilty to one count of possession 
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of a firearm by a convicted felon, and two counts of distribution and possession with 
intent to distribute a quantity of cocaine base.  The District Court sentenced Brown to a 
term of 210 months’ imprisonment.  Brown now attacks both the substantive and 
procedural reasonableness of the District Court’s sentence.  For the following reasons, we 
will affirm the District Court’s judgment of conviction. 
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 In August 2009, Brown obtained a handgun from Jamie McClellan (“McClellan”), 
a co-defendant in this case, in exchange for three grams of crack cocaine.  This 
transaction occurred at the home of Kevin Gardner (“Gardner”), a confidential informant 
for the Government.  Brown left the handgun at Gardner’s home, but confirmed that the 
handgun belonged to him in subsequent recorded phone calls with Gardner.  
 A month later, agents with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms set up a 
surveillance camera inside Gardner’s home, and captured both audio and video 
recordings of Brown selling 4.9 grams of crack cocaine to Gardner.  
 Based on the quantum of evidence, Brown pled guilty to one count of possession 
of a firearm by a convicted felon, and two counts of distribution and possession with 
intent to distribute crack cocaine. 
 At sentencing, the District Court imposed enhancements on Brown’s sentence 
                                                                                                                                                             
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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based on Brown’s three prior state court felony convictions involving controlled 
substances.1  The District Court applied a downward adjustment for acceptance of 
responsibility.  Based on a category VI criminal history, Brown’s advisory Guidelines 
range was 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment.  The District Court properly considered 
several § 3553(a) factors, including the offense’s nature and circumstances, Brown’s 
history and characteristics, deterrence, and training.  Ultimately, the District Court 
imposed a sentence of 210 months’ imprisonment. 2 
 
II. ANALYSIS  
 We review sentences “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”  Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007).  “[W]e are to ensure that a substantively 
reasonable sentence has been imposed in a procedurally fair way.”  United States v. 
Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008).3   
                                                 
1 The enhancements were for (1) career offender status, because this case involves 
drug distribution, and (2) armed career criminal status because Brown pled guilty to an 
offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).   
 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
 
 3 When no objection is made in the District Court, sentencing procedure is 
reviewed for plain error.  United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 
2014).  However, “[b]ecause defendants sentenced before the issuance of [Flores-Mejia] 
had not been warned that they had a duty to object to the sentencing court’s procedural 
error after sentencing, we will not apply this new rule retroactively and will, instead, 
review for abuse of discretion. Applying that standard, we have held that a district court 
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 Under our three-step sentencing framework, district courts must: (1) “calculate a 
defendant’s Guidelines sentence precisely as they would have before [United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)],” (2) “‘formally rul[e] on the motions of both parties and 
stat[e] on the record whether they are granting a departure,’” and (3) “‘exercise [] [their] 
discretion by considering the relevant [§ 3553(a)] factors’. . . in setting the sentence they 
impose regardless whether it varies from the sentence calculated under the Guidelines.” 
United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. King, 
454 F.3d 187, 196, 194 (3d Cir. 2006) (alterations in original)).  Under the third step, the 
District Court “must ‘acknowledge and respond to any properly presented sentencing 
argument which has colorable legal merit and a factual basis.’”  Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 
at 256 (quoting United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 411 (3d Cir. 2012)). 
 Here, the District Court properly applied this framework.  First, the Court 
determined the advisory Guidelines range.  Counsel for the Appellant indicated that he 
and his client understood the Court’s assessment of the range, and no departure motions 
were made.  Before imposing the sentence, the Court considered several § 3553(a) 
factors, including inter alia, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the Appellant’s 
history and characteristics, deterrence, and training.  Accordingly, there was no 
procedural error. 
                                                                                                                                                             
abuses its discretion when it fails to give ‘meaningful consideration’ to an argument 
advanced by the defendant.”  Id. at 259. 
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 We next consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.  Our review of 
the application of the § 3553(a) factors is “highly deferential.”  United States v. Bungar, 
478 F.3d 540, 543 (3d Cir. 2007).  Moreover, “[w]e may not substitute our judgment for 
the sentencing court’s.”  Id.  Indeed, even if this Court would have imposed a different 
sentence, we must not do so as long as any reasonable court could have imposed the 
given sentence.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009).  Although 
Appellant sought a sentence below the Guidelines range, the Court properly considered 
the § 3553(a) factors in denying this request and imposing a sentence at the bottom of the 
Guidelines range and explained its reasons for doing so.  See Rita v. United States, 551 
U.S. 338, 356 (2007); Levinson, 543 F. 3d at 196 (the district court’s explanation must be 
“sufficient for us to see that the particular circumstances of the case have been given 
meaningful consideration within the parameters of § 3553(a)”).  Thus, this sentence is not 
substantively unreasonable. 
 
III. CONCLUSION  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of 
conviction. 
